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Abstract
When are comparative statements credible? For instance, when can a professor rank dif-
ferent students for an employer, or a stock analyst rank diﬀerent stocks for a client? We show
that simple complementarity conditions ensure that an expert with private information about
multiple issues can credibly rank the issues for a decision maker. By restricting the expert’s
ability to exaggerate, multidimensional cheap talk of this form permits communication when
it would not be credible in a single dimension. The communication gains can be substantial
with even a couple of issues, and the complete ranking is asymptotically equivalent to full rev-
elation as the number of issues becomes large. Nevertheless, partial rankings are sometimes
more credible and/or more proﬁtable for the expert than the complete ranking. We conﬁrm
the robustness of comparative cheap talk to asymmetries that are not too large. Moreover, we
show that for a suﬃciently large number of independent is s u e st h e r ea r ea l w a y ss o m ei s s u e s
suﬃciently symmetric to permit inﬂuential cheap talk.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D82; D74; D72; C72. Key Words: multidimensional cheap talk; comple-
mentarities
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Simple comparative statements such as “that dress looks better” or “this one is best” are widely
used and often believed. More formal communication frequently relies on comparisons as well.
For instance, a professor ranks diﬀerent students for an employer, a stock analyst ranks diﬀerent
s t o c k sf o rac l i e n t ,o raw e b s i t er a n k sd i ﬀerent products for a buyer. It is also common to reveal
comparative information implicitly. For instance, a lobbyist discusses one bill rather than another
with a senator, or a newspaper emphasizes one story over another.
Despite their widespread use, little is known about the role of comparative statements in
strategic communication. Are such statements more credible than claims such as “they both
look great” or “every student is excellent”? How much information can comparative statements
convey? When does it make sense to withhold comparative information? And are comparative
statements still credible when the speaker is not impartial, e.g. when a professor has a favorite
student, or a salesperson receives a larger commission on a particular product?
To answer these questions we follow the standard Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of costless,
unveriﬁable “cheap talk” in which an expert with an incentive to exaggerate has private infor-
mation of interest to a decision maker. For instance, a lobbyist wants to oversell the merits of
a bill, or a stock analyst proﬁts from overestimating the value of a stock. The Crawford-Sobel
model is used to analyze communication in ﬁelds from accounting (Fischer and Stocken, 2001) to
zoology (Enquist, Ghirlanda, and Hurd, 1998), but it assumes that there is only one dimension
in which the expert has information and in which the decision maker acts. To understand the
role of comparative statements, we extend the model to allow for multiple dimensions, e.g. a
lobbyist knows the merits of multiple bills, a stock analyst knows the values of multiple stocks,
or a professor knows the abilities of multiple students.
In this multidimensional cheap talk model, we ﬁnd that a strong conﬂict of interest within
dimensions still permits enough commonality of interest to allow comparative communication
across dimensions. This contrasts with the standard one-dimensional result that cheap talk breaks
down when the expert’s incentive to exaggerate is too strong. For instance, even if a professor
is so inclined to exaggerate the abilities of her students that cheap talk regarding an individual
student is not credible, we show that it is often credible for a professor to rank one student above
another. Such “comparative cheap talk” can be an equilibrium because it simultaneously sends
both favorable and unfavorable information, thereby eliminating the ability to exaggerate.
We ﬁnd that simple complementarity (i.e., supermodularity) conditions on preferences capture
the notion of commonality of interest across dimensions. They imply that the expert wants the
decision maker to take a higher action when the variable known by the expert is higher, and that
the decision maker wants to take a higher action when this variable is expected to be higher.
1Consequently, both parties agree on the ranking of desired actions in each state, even though
interests may diﬀer strongly on the magnitude of the desired actions. The complementarity
conditions appear to ﬁt many real world situations and are satisﬁed under the basic assumptions
of the Crawford-Sobel model. They are suﬃcient for the credibility of the complete ranking of all
the variables, and for the credibility of less informative partial rankings in which the variables are
sorted into categories, e.g. “buy” or “sell” ratings used by an analyst following multiple stocks.
Even though comparative cheap talk only provides rankings of the issues, the communication
gains can be substantial. As the number of dimensions grows, the expert’s ranking becomes an
increasingly accurate signal of each variable’s value. For instance, the class rank of a student can
be quite informative of ability when the class size is very large. More generally, for any p ∈ (0,1),
as the number N of independently distributed variables increases the pNth variable becomes very
likely to be very close to the pth quantile of the original distribution. As a result, revealing the
expert’s information through a complete ranking is asymptotically equivalent to revealing all of
the expert’s private information.
These results are for symmetric “apples to apples” comparisons in which the expert has the
same preference weight on each issue and the distributions of the variables are identical, so that
the game is an N-dimensional replication of a standard one-dimensional cheap talk game.1 We
also consider the asymmetric “apples to oranges” case in which it is common knowledge that
the players’ preferences and/or distributions are diﬀerent for each issue. Such asymmetries can
counteract the incentive generated by preference complementarities to provide a truthful ranking.
For instance, if a stock analyst receives higher compensation for promoting a particular stock, the
analyst’s ranking of the stock might be suspect. Or if one student is already expected to be quite
good, a professor might be tempted to rank another less appreciated student higher. We ﬁnd that
a comparative cheap talk equilibrium between any two issues still exists if the asymmetries are
suﬃciently small, but that it often breaks down when the asymmetries become larger.
Even with arbitrary asymmetries, we ﬁnd that possibilities for inﬂuential communication are
generated simply by adding enough independently distributed dimensions. Provided utility func-
tions and distributions are chosen from a compact set, as the number of issues increases some
of the issues must be distributed similarly and each of the expert’s and the decision maker’s
preferences across these issues must also be similar. Whenever this happens, comparative cheap
1We continue to follow other assumptions from the Crawford-Sobel framework that have been relaxed elsewhere
in the literature. For instance, we do not consider situations where the game is repeated (Sobel, 1985; Stocken,
2000; Morris, 2001), there are multiple stages of cheap talk (Aumann and Hart, 2003; Krishna and Morgan, 2004),
the expert and decision-maker are not necessarily fully rational (Crawford, 2003; Ottaviani and Squintani, 2002),
or there is some uncertainty over the expert’s incentive to exaggerate (Morgan and Stocken, 2003; Dimitrakas and
Saraﬁdis, 2004).
2talk between these issues becomes credible and inﬂuential. For instance, suppose that a liberal
and conservative disagree on every issue. As long as they have enough issues to discuss, there
must be some issues across which each has suﬃciently similar preferences to permit meaningful
communication.
We apply our results to two types of games. The ﬁrst is what we call valuation games and
includes the canonical game with quadratic preferences ﬁrst introduced as an example by Crawford
and Sobel for the one-dimensional case. In this game a biased expert tries to inﬂuence a decision
maker’s estimate of the situation when the two sides have partial common interests in each
dimension. Valuation games also include cases where the expert wants to increase the receiver’s
estimate as much as possible, e.g. a stock analyst tries to push up stock market valuations, or
an auction house tries to push up auction prices. Despite these strong incentives to exaggerate
within each dimension, comparative cheap talk across dimensions is credible.
The second type is what we call recommendation games and covers situations where the expert
eﬀectively recommends one of two possible actions, e.g. whether or not to hire a student, to buy
a product, to grant a license, or to vote for a proposal. In recommendation games we ﬁnd that
the expert prefers ex ante to reveal a partial ranking rather than the complete ranking. For
instance, if there are three students being recommended by a professor and the middle student
is unlikely to receive a job based on the complete ranking, an alternative is to put the top two
students in a group and not diﬀerentiate between them. As the number of issues increases, such
groupings can be used more and more eﬀectively to maximize the expert’s payoﬀs. The gains from
partial rankings may explain why highly ranked schools often obscure the relative quality of their
graduates, either by grade inﬂation as in Ivy League undergraduate programs, or by withholding
grades from employers as in some elite M.B.A. programs.2
In the Crawford-Sobel model of communication within a single dimension, even a slight in-
centive to exaggerate makes it impossible for the expert to reveal the exact value of the unknown
variable, but if the incentive is not too strong the expert can communicate coarse information
about the range of the variable by partitioning the variable space into diﬀerent intervals reﬂecting
qualitative information such as “good or bad” or “low, medium, or high”. Comparative cheap talk
across dimensions partitions the variable space diﬀerently than does such “interval cheap talk”,
but the two forms of cheap talk can appear quite similar. For instance, if a stock analyst places
stocks into buy or sell categories, the analyst could be engaged in interval cheap talk regarding
each stock, or in comparative cheap talk that provides a ranking of the stocks. The key diﬀerence
is that under interval cheap talk the credibility of a buy ranking depends on a stock analyst
not wanting to push up the value of a very bad stock, while under comparative cheap talk the
2For related analyses, see Chan, Li, and Suen (2003) and Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2003).
3credibility of a buy ranking depends on the presence of other stocks in the sell category.
The potential for communication across multiple dimensions oﬀers insight into how organi-
zational structures are aﬀected by the relative advantages of delegation versus cheap talk. In
the one-dimensional Crawford-Sobel model the decision maker often prefers to give the expert
complete freedom to make an informed but biased decision rather than rely on the expert to
provide noisy and biased cheap talk (Dessein, 2003). For instance, an upper manager might fully
delegate authority to better-informed lower managers rather than rely on them for biased advice
about a project.3 In our multidimensional model the beneﬁts to the decision maker from cheap
talk increase with extra dimensions, but there is no corresponding increase in the beneﬁts of full
delegation. For instance, if there are two projects that a lower manager has information on and
she prefers the maximal action on each project, comparative cheap talk about their relative merits
can improve the decision-making process, but fully delegating the decisions to the lower manager
will just result in the maximal action being chosen on each project.4
The idea that additional dimensions can facilitate communication in standard cheap talk
games is investigated by Battaglini (2002) for the case of multiple experts.5 He ﬁnds that a
decision maker can structure competition between experts to induce full information revelation,
and that in special cases a single expert can reveal full information in one of two dimensions. The
question of when cheap talk with a single expert breaks down is examined by Levy and Razin
(2003) in a model where preferences are deﬁned by the expert’s bias, i.e., the distance between the
expert’s and the decision maker’s ideal actions. They ﬁnd that with two dimensions, for any given
bound on permissible perturbations of the distribution of the issues, if one lets the expert’s bias in
each dimension become suﬃciently large, then one can ﬁnd perturbations within the permissible
bound such that inﬂuential cheap talk is not an equilibrium of the perturbed game. Our two main
robustness results provide a more optimistic perspective on the existence of inﬂuential equilibria in
such models. First, there always exists an inﬂuential comparative cheap talk equilibrium for open
sets of preferences and distributions that are not too asymmetric across dimensions, regardless of
the magnitude of the biases. Second, in continuously parameterized models where the parameter
3Of course, delegation may not be feasible in certain contexts, e.g., when the sender is a hypochondriac and the
receiver is a doctor.
4An alternative to full delegation is partial delegation in which the sender is given a limited set of actions to
choose from and the receiver commits to following the sender’s choices. For the same reasons we examine, the
beneﬁts of partial delegation also increase with multiple dimensions. Because of the commitment assumption,
partial delegation (or screening) always weakly beats cheap talk from the receiver’s perspective. Closely related
is the mechanism design case where the receiver can also reward or penalize the sender for diﬀerent choices. See
Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003) for results of a similar ﬂavor in a mechanism design context.
5See also Austen-Smith (1990) for a model with multiple experts and Spector (2000) for a model in which players
with divergent priors learn from each other the true state of the world.
4space is compact (speciﬁcally, the biases are bounded), an inﬂuential cheap talk equilibrium always
exists when there are a suﬃcient number of independently distributed dimensions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider the symmetric model in
which the distribution functions and utility functions are the same across dimensions. In Section
3 we use these results to examine the general case. Section 4 shows how the model can be used to
analyze two types of games with a wide range of practical applications while Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The Symmetric Model
Consider a multidimensional game in which player S (the sender or expert) possesses private
information about N ≥ 2d i ﬀerent issues that player R (the receiver or decision-maker) takes
actions on. The sender’s private information about issue k =1 ,...,N is represented by a random
variable θk ∈ Θ =[ 0 ,1]. Let θ =( θ1,...,θ N)a n dl e tF denote the joint distribution of θ with
support on ΘN. We assume that F has a strictly positive continuous density f.W ew i l ld e n o t e
by Fk and fk the marginal distribution and the marginal density of θk respectively. Throughout
this section we assume that f is symmetric, i.e., it is invariant to permutations of its arguments.
On occasion, we will also consider the more restrictive case in which f displays independence, i.e.,
f(θ)=Πkfk(θk) and all the fk(·) are identical.
At the beginning of the game the sender sends a message m from a set M that is heard by
player R.6 Subsequently, for each issue k player R chooses an action ak from a set A that is
independent of k. We assume that A is a compact convex subset of R that we will also identify
with the unit interval [0,1]. Let a =( a1,...,a N) denote the action proﬁle chosen by the receiver.7
The payoﬀ from issue k to player i ∈ {S,R} is given by a function ui : Θ × A → R that is
continuous in each argument. In this section we assume that the utility functions are symmetric,
i.e. ui is independent of k.F o r e a c h θk let a∗(θk) be the unique maximand of uR(θk,a k)w i t h
respect to ak.W ed e n o t eb yUi(θ,a) the total payoﬀ to player i from an action proﬁle a in a state
of the world θ, and assume that it is additive across issues so that Ui(θ,a)=
P
k ui(θk,a k). While
the additive form is restrictive, it rules out direct preference spillovers across dimensions and so
highlights that any expansion in the beneﬁts of communication with added dimensions does not
arise out of exploiting such spillovers. Notice also that the payoﬀs of either player do not directly
depend on the message m that is sent by player S. In other words, the sender’s message is pure
6T h er e s u l t sa r er o b u s tt oa l l o w i n gd i ﬀerent receivers for each issue, as long as the sender’s message is a public
message.
7Note that the receiver can take actions independently on each issue. In some cases bundling the issues so that
actions are interdependent can encourage communication as shown in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2003).
5cheap talk.
For any set X,l e t∆(X) denote the set of probability distributions on X. A strategy for the
sender is a function µ : ΘN → ∆(M) and a strategy for the receiver is a function σ : M → ∆(AN).
Beliefs of the receiver over ΘN (inferred from a message m) are given by a function φ : M →
∆(ΘN). We use the standard notion of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium.8
Let µ(m)=P r [ {θ ∈ Θ|µ(m|θ) > 0}] be the probability with which a message m is chosen by
S given a strategy µ. Cheap talk equilibria are interesting when communication by the sender
inﬂuences the probability distribution of actions chosen by the receiver. Formally, an equilibrium
(µ,σ,φ)i ss a i dt ob einﬂuential if there are two messages m and m0 with µ(m),µ(m0) > 0s u c h
that σ(·|m) 6= σ(·|m0). In looking for inﬂuential equilibria, we follow the usual practice in the
literature on cheap talk games and rule out the possibility of out-of-equilibrium messages. That
is, we assume that for each message m ∈ M, µ(m) > 0. This is without loss of generality since
any time an equilibrium exists where some messages are not chosen in equilibrium, an outcome
equivalent equilibrium exists where all messages are chosen on the equilibrium path.
We focus on the existence of inﬂuential cheap talk equilibria where the sender’s message
consists of disclosing a partial or complete ranking on her private information θ1,...,θ N about
the N issues. Such a message contains information about each issue that is not independent of
the information it contains about other issues. As we show below, this implies that even when
there is a strong conﬂict of interest between the sender and receiver with regard to the optimal
action that should be taken on each issue, informative communication is still possible. We call
such strategies comparative cheap talk strategies.
Formally, let θi:N indicate the ith smallest realization of the N diﬀerent θk. Let C =( c1,...,c |C|)
denote a ranking, i.e., a partition of the set of indices {1,...,N} of {θ1:N,...,θ N:N} into |C| ≤ N
elements or categories, such that the jth category cj has |cj| ≥ 1e l e m e n t sw i t h
P|C|
j=1 |cj| = N.
That is, the ﬁrst category c1 = {1,...,|c1|} denotes a set identifying the lowest |c1| of the θ’s,
{θ1:N,...,θ |c1|:N}, the second category c2 = {|c1|+1,...,|c2|} denotes a set identifying the next set
of the |c2| lowest θ’s, {θ|c1|+1:N,...,θ |c1|+|c2|:N},a n ds oo n .
A comparative cheap talk strategy is represented by a ranking or categorization C which is
ﬁxed and does not depend on the realization of θ. The strategy is described as follows. For each
realization of θ, the sender announces that the |c1| issues with the lowest values of θk are in category
c1, the next |c2| issues are in category c2 and so on. If there are ties between some of the θk’s, the
sender uniformly randomizes when she sorts those issues into diﬀerent categories. Consequently,
8Since R’s action has to be optimal given his inference about θ upon hearing m, this distinguishes our cheap
talk model from a screening problem where R ﬁrst commits to a menu of actions for each message and S chooses
among them.
6the receiver knows that for issues in higher categories the sender’s private information has a weakly
higher value and cannot distinguish between issues within a category. The ﬁnest possible ranking
C =( c1,...,c N)w i t hcj = {j} for all j =1 ,...,N, corresponds to the strategy where the sender
completely ranks the N issues. On the other hand, the coarsest possible ranking, C =( {c1})
with c1 = {1,...,N}, corresponds to an uninformative babbling strategy. We will use the term
partial ranking to denote rankings that are coarser than the complete ranking and ﬁner than the
babbling strategy.9
Notice next that since f is symmetric, for any candidate equilibrium ranking C, the distribu-
tion Fcj:N of θk given that the sender has announced that it belongs to category j does not depend
on the index k. That is, Fcj:N can be deﬁned to be the distribution function for θcj:N,w h e r et h e
latter is a random variable that is equally likely to be one of the θi:N’s that belong to category
cj. Therefore, for any comparative cheap talk strategy C, the symmetry of f implies that the
possible equilibrium beliefs of the receiver with respect to θk are summarized by the collection
{Fcj:N}
|C|
j=1 with corresponding densities {fcj:N}
|C|
j=1.
O b s e r v et h a ti fa na c t i o np r o ﬁle a =( a1,...,a N) maximizes R’s expected total payoﬀ given a








Our assumptions on uR(θk,a k)a n dA imply that the maximization in (1) has a solution, which
we denote as acj:N.
Our ﬁr s tr e s u l tp r o v i d e ss u ﬃcient conditions on preferences for comparative cheap talk to be
an equilibrium in the symmetric model. These complementarity conditions take the form of a
supermodularity condition. We adapt from Athey (2002) the deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 For i ∈ {S,R},u i satisﬁes supermodularity (respectively, strict supermodularity)
if, for all ak >a 0
k,t h ed i ﬀerence ui(θk,a k) − ui(θk,a 0
k) as a function of θk is non-decreasing
(respectively, increasing) in θk.
These complementary conditions on preferences imply that the receiver will take higher actions
for issues announced to be in higher categories and, given this, the sender has no incentive to
misreport the ranking. Comparative cheap talk is therefore an equilibrium. Theorem 1 makes
this precise.
9In cheap talk games it is well known that there always exists an equilibrium (that is not inﬂuential) where the
sender uses the babbling strategy. Because of this it is not possible to use traditional ﬁxed—point type arguments
to demonstrate the existence of inﬂuential equilibria.
7Theorem 1 Suppose f is symmetric and uS and uR are supermodular. Then the complete ranking
and every partial ranking are comparative cheap talk equilibria.
Proof. Consider any ranking C =( c1,...,c |C|) and note that for any message that puts issue
k in category cj, a best-response for R is to choose ak = acj:N, the solution to (1). More generally,
for any announced message corresponding to the ranking C, it is a best-response for R to choose
the action ac1:N for each of the |c1| issues with the lowest value, the action ac2:N for each of the
next set of |c2| issues and so on, ﬁnally choosing the action ac|C|:N for each of the
¯ ¯c|C|
¯ ¯ issues that
have the highest value.
Since marginals for order statistics are ﬁrst order stochastically rankable, we observe imme-
diately that the Fcj:N are stochastically ordered in j.S i n c euR is supermodular, it follows from
Theorem 3.10.1 in Topkis (1998) that the acj:N are non—decreasing in j.S i n c euS is supermodular,
this implies that the sender has no incentive to misreport the correct ranking. To see this, let
k0,kbe such that θk0 ≤ θk. For any j, the supermodularity of uS implies,
uS(θk0,a c1:N)+uS(θk,a cj:N) ≥ uS(θk0,a cj:N)+uS(θk,a c1:N).
Consequently, for any realization of θ the sender can do no better than to announce the lowest
category for the issue with the lowest value, regardless of her announcements for the other issues.
Given this, it follows that the seller can do no better than to announce the lowest category still
available for the issue with the second-lowest value. Continuing this logic, for every realization
of θ, the sender can do no better than to announce that the |c1| issues with the lowest values
belong to category 1, the next |c2| issues to category 2 and so on, until all of the issues are ranked
correctly. In other words, truthfully announcing the ranking is a best—response for the sender.10
¥
The complementarity conditions in Theorem 1 provide our basic measure of commonality
of interest with respect to communication across dimensions. Under these conditions, sender
and receiver interests coincide on the rankings of the actions so comparative cheap talk is an
equilibrium. Comparative cheap talk is not credible when such complementarity conditions are
not shared by the sender and the receiver, for instance, when uS is strictly submodular and uR
is strictly supermodular. Notice that the equilibria characterized by Theorem 1 always convey
information but are not guaranteed to be inﬂuential. They are inﬂuential if the information in the
ranking is of suﬃcient importance to the receiver that not all the actions acj:N are equal to each
10In the special case where f in addition displays independence, the condition on u
R in the statement of Theorem
1 can be weakened to satisfy single—crossing. In such cases, the {fcj:N} satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio
property and so, from Theorem 2 in Athey (2002), the acj:N are non—decreasing. The rest of the arguments in the
proof above then follow.
8other. Simple suﬃcient conditions to ensure that no two actions are the same are that uR(θk,a k)
be strictly supermodular and diﬀerentiable, with the derivative with respect to ak being negative
at ak = 1 and positive at ak =0f o ra l m o s te v e r yθk.
Supermodularity of uS and uR i sa l s oa s s u m e di nt h eC r a w f o r d - S o b e lm o d e li no r d e rt og e n e r -
ate communication within a single dimension. Therefore the idea that shared complementarities
are a measure of commonality of interest applies both to communication across as well as within
dimensions. However, since these conditions are suﬃcient for comparative cheap talk, communi-
cation is in a sense easier when there are multiple dimensions. In particular, the Crawford-Sobel
model makes the additional assumptions that uS and uR are concave and have interior maxi-
mands. In contrast Theorem 1 allows uS to be strictly increasing in ak for each θk, a condition
that rules out the possibility of inﬂuential cheap talk in a single dimension.
Complementarities are suﬃcient for communication in part because of the symmetry assump-
tions adopted in this section. Asymmetries can arise in the distribution functions and also in
the utility functions. Since asymmetries can limit the potential for comparative cheap talk, the
degree of symmetry across dimensions can be thought of as a measure of the similarity of interest
of each player in multidimensional environments. We investigate the eﬀect of asymmetries on
comparative cheap talk in the next section.
Theorem 1 can be immediately extended to demonstrate the existence of other inﬂuential
equilibria such as ranking a subset of the N variables and being “silent” on the remaining variables.
Similarly, sorting the issues into disjoint groups and engaging in comparative cheap talk within
but not across groups is also an equilibrium. We refer to such strategies as partial rankings as
well and consider them in the next section.
Note ﬁnally that other inﬂuential equilibria may coexist with comparative cheap talk equilibria
under the conditions of Theorem 1. For instance, in the canonical quadratic version of the
Crawford-Sobel model (see Section 4.1), interval cheap talk in each dimension is still an equilibrium
as long as the parameter b is small enough. In this paper our focus is on comparative cheap talk
and we do not attempt a full characterization of the set of inﬂuential equilibria.
Can comparative cheap talk be very informative? Theorem 2 uses the Glivenko-Cantelli
theorem to show that when f is i.i.d. comparative information is essentially all information for
suﬃciently many issues.
Theorem 2 If f displays symmetry and independence, per—issue sender and receiver payoﬀs
under the complete ranking asymptotically approach their expected full information values as the







ui(θj:N,a j:N)=E[ui(θk,a ∗(θk))],a . s .
9.




k (q)a . s . ( 2 )
where dxe denotes the smallest integer at least as large as x and, since f is i.i.d., Fk is the same





To see this, suppose that (3) does not hold. Fix q. Since the sequence adqNe:N is a sequence in a
closed set A, it has a convergent subsequence converging to a point in A,s a y ,a0 6= a∗(F−1
k (q)).
Since a∗(F−1
k (q) )i st h eu n i q u em a x i m a n do fuR(F−1




k (q),a 0). Then for N large enough, by continuity of uR, E[uR(θj:N,a ∗(F−1
k (q)))] >






k (q))),a.s. for all i ∈ {S,R}. (4)























k (q)))dq,a . s .
= E[ui(θk,a ∗(θk))], a.s.
where the ﬁrst equality is deﬁnitional, the second follows from the boundedness of a continuous
function on a compact domain, the third follows from (4), and the last is again deﬁnitional. ¥
Theorem 2 uses a law of large numbers type argument and so relies on independence. Full
independence of the θk is not needed in order to obtain weaker but analogous results. For example,
if an analyst believes the value of a stock is θk = ω + εk where ω is a common factor capturing
the overall direction of the market and the εk’s are i.i.d. idiosyncratic factors, then the complete
ranking of stocks by an analyst will asymptotically reveal all the εk’s but not ω.
Since the receiver can always choose the same actions when he has more information, he
prefers the more informative complete ranking to any partial ranking. In the limit as the number
of issues increases, the receiver attains his full information payoﬀ under the complete ranking by
10Theorem 2, which is the best the receiver can do under any mechanism, including partial or full
delegation. For the sender such general conclusions about ﬁner versus coarser rankings are not
possible. We will discuss the impact on the sender’s payoﬀs in the context of our applications in
Section 4. But ﬁrst we turn to a consideration of inﬂuential cheap talk in multiple dimensions
under asymmetries.
3 The General Model
So far we have assumed that the multidimensional game is a straightforward replication of the one-
dimensional game. This assumption highlights our main ﬁnding that adding dimensions allows
for cheap talk possibilities not present in a single dimension. But clearly there are situations
where the sender or receiver is known to care diﬀerently about some dimensions or where the
distributions are not identical. We will show in this section that our main ﬁnding is robust to
such asymmetries.
Note ﬁrst that comparative statements are fully robust to some types of asymmetries. For
instance, it might be common knowledge that a professor favors students of a particular gender,
nationality, or ﬁe l dw i t hn oa s y m m e t r i e sa m o n gs t u d e n t sw i t h i nat y p e . I nt h i sc a s ee v e ni f
comparisons across favored and unfavored types of students are suspect, rankings within the
same type are clearly still credible.11 In this section we investigate the more interesting case
where issues with diﬀerent preferences and distributions are compared so that the receiver has
good reason to be suspicious whether a higher ranked θk is really larger. In such situations it is
natural to consider comparative cheap talk that adjusts for such favoritism, i.e., cases where the
sender does not directly rank the θk but instead ranks monotonic transformations of them. For
instance, if the sender is known to be very biased in favor of issue 1, it might be credible for the
sender to state whether or not 2θ1 ≥ θ2 instead of whether or not θ1 ≥ θ2. These adjustments
could be explicit in the ranking or they could just be implicit in that the receiver knows that the
ranking of the issues should be “taken with a grain of salt” and adjusted to reﬂect the sender’s
biases or other asymmetries.
The model with possible asymmetries in the utility functions and the distribution function
is speciﬁed by a continuous joint density f for θ with support on [0,1]N that is not necessarily
11The same holds if it is common knowledge that there are diﬀerences in ability distributions across types. In
either case, by a simple extension of Theorem 2, sender and receiver payoﬀs are asymptotically equivalent to full
information revelation as the number of each type of student increases.






where ui =( ui
1,...,u i
N) is a vector of utility functions for i, one for each issue.
We will utilize the Implicit Function Theorem for the results in this Section. In order to do
so we will impose some regularity conditions on preferences in addition to the supermodularity
conditions of the previous section. The conditions are suﬃcient for all proofs to follow, although
not necessary for all the conclusions, as examples in Section 4 demonstrate. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that for each k =1 ,...,nand i ∈ {S,R}, ui
k is C2.L e tC2 be the set of C2 functions with
domain in [0,1]2 and range in R.L e tUS ⊂ C2 be the subset of such functions that are strictly
supermodular (i.e., have strictly positive second cross—partials; see, e.g., Topkis, 1998). For each
k, we will allow uS
k to be any element of US. For the receiver, in order to guarantee that ﬁrst
order conditions for an interior maximum are necessary and suﬃcient to characterize the solution
to the receiver’s problem, we assume in addition that, for each k =1 ,...,n, uR
k is strictly concave
in the action and that, for a.e. θk ∈ [0,1], ∂uR
k (θk,0)/∂ak > 0 >∂ u R
k (θk,1)/∂ak.L e tUR⊂ US
be the subset of utility functions that satisfy these additional regularity conditions. For each k,
we will assume that uR
k is an element of UR.
Let DN be the set of continuous joint densities with support on [0,1]N and D∗
N be the subset
consisting of symmetric densities. Let P = UN
S × UN
R × DN.A g e n e r a l N-dimensional game
Γ(p,N) is speciﬁed by the number of dimensions N and primitives p =( uS,uR,f) ∈ P that
specify the preferences and the distribution. We will denote a symmetric version of such a game
by primitives p∗ =( uS∗,uR∗,f∗)w h e r eui∗ =( ui∗,...,u i∗)f o rs o m eui∗ ∈ Ui, i ∈ {S,R}, and
f∗ ∈ D∗
N is a symmetric density. Let P∗ be the set of symmetric primitives. Let C2 have the C2—
uniform convergence norm and DN the sup (i.e., C0—uniform convergence) norm. All subspaces
and product spaces have associated relative and product topologies.
Theorem 3 below perturbs the symmetric model around a symmetric solution to show the
generic robustness of comparative cheap talk to small asymmetries (i.e., their regularity).12 The
proof is a straightforward application of the Implicit Function Theorem and we present it in the
Appendix.
Theorem 3 Suppose N =2 . Comparative cheap talk is generically robust to small asymmetries:
t h e r ee x i s t sa no p e na n dd e n s es u b s e tPgen of P∗ such that for each p∗ ∈ Pgen,t h e r ee x i s t s
an e i g h b o r h o o dB(p∗) in P such that for each p ∈ B(p∗) an inﬂuential comparative cheap talk
equilibrium exists.
12We thank Joel Sobel for suggesting a robustness proof based on this approach.
12Proof. See Appendix. ¥
Crawford and Sobel (1982) show that small conﬂicts of interest within dimensions do not
destroy the viability of inﬂuential cheap talk. Theorem 3 is an analog of this result for multi-
dimensional cheap talk when asymmetries are thought of as creating a conﬂict of interest with
respect to communication across dimensions. Notice also that Theorem 3 is at ﬁrst sight at
odds with the result of Levy and Razin (2003) regarding quadratic preferences discussed earlier.
Applied to our context, their result suggests that large biases within dimensions can reduce the
tolerance of comparative cheap talk to asymmetries across dimensions, i.e., the open sets B(p∗)
in the statement of Theorem 3 presumably become small as the biases rise.
Theorem 3 is stated for the case N =2 .W en o wa p p l yi tt op r o v eo u rn e x tr e s u l tf o rt h ec a s e
of N ≥ 2 independently distributed dimensions (i.e., games where f displays independence but
is not necessarily symmetric). Cheap talk games with independently distributed dimensions have
two nice properties from our perspective. The ﬁrst is that if an inﬂuential equilibrium exists in
an N-dimensional game, it exists for every N0 dimensional game, N0 >N ,that has a subset of
dimensions identical to that of the N-dimensional game. The second is that under independence
the space of primitives has a simple product structure. We will use both of these properties of
cheap talk games with independent dimensions for our next result.
To do so let D be the set of continuous densities with support on [0,1] and, abusing notation
slightly, let P = US × UR × D. N o t i c et h a ta nN-dimensional game with independence across
dimensions is deﬁned by a tuple (uS,uR,f) ∈ PN, where f is now a vector (f1,...,f N) of densities
one for each dimension. Theorem 3 applied to this case asserts the existence of an open and dense
subset Pgen of P such that for every p ∈ Pgen there exists a neighborhood B(p) such that an
inﬂuential equilibrium exists in the N-dimensional game as long as the primitives for at least two
of the dimensions are chosen from B(p). Consider now an N-dimensional game where primitives
in each dimension are chosen from some non-empty set Q ⊂ Pgen.F o r p ∈ QN, Γ(p,N)i st h e
multi-dimensional cheap talk game with primitives p and N independent dimensions. We have
the following result regarding the existence of an inﬂuential equilibrium in such a game.
Theorem 4 For each compact Q there exists a number of dimensions N∗(Q) such that, for each
N ≥ N∗(Q), and every p ∈ QN,a ni n ﬂuential equilibrium exists in the game Γ(p,N) with N
independently distributed dimensions.
Proof. Consider the collection {B(p)}p∈Q where B(p) are the open sets whose existence is
asserted by Theorem 3. This is an open cover of Q.S i n c eQ is compact it has a ﬁnite subcover.
Let N∗(Q)−1 be the number of elements in this ﬁnite subcover. When N ≥ N∗(Q), the primitives
for at least two of the dimensions must lie in the same element of the subcover, at which point we
13can apply Theorem 3 to create inﬂuential comparative cheap talk across those two dimensions. ¥
Notice ﬁr s tt h a tt h en u m b e rN∗(Q) depends on the set Q and not on the particular choice
of p in QN.T h e r e f o r e i n ﬂuential equilibria always exist when there are enough independent
dimensions, regardless of the speciﬁc choice of primitives within each dimension, as long as the
admissible set of such primitives is compact. Notice next from the proof that as N becomes large,
we must have at least N/2N∗ pairs of issues that allow comparative cheap talk across those two
issues. It follows that as N becomes large, there exists a sequence of equilibria with the property
that the number of messages with distinct meanings (equivalently, the number of distinct action
proﬁles induced in equilibrium) must go to inﬁnity along this sequence. In the limit, there will
be pair-wise inﬂuential cheap talk involving a proportion of at least 1/N ∗ of the issues. Since the
existence of these pair-wise comparisons is obtained from the arguments in Theorem 3, they are
“close” to the equilibria of the symmetric case and hence quite informative. Observe ﬁnally that
Theorem 4 does not prevent a modeler from choosing a sequence of primitives for each dimension
such that no inﬂuential equilibrium exists for any N. Such a sequence cannot lie in a compact
set in the space of primitives. We provide such an example in the next section.
4E x a m p l e s
We now consider two types of games that illustrate key aspects of our results. The ﬁrst type
includes the canonical quadratic preferences example introduced by Crawford and Sobel, while
the second type covers cases where the receiver has a binary agenda.
4.1 Valuation games
First consider games in which the receiver’s equilibrium action equals the expected value of θk
given all available information. For instance, the receiver wants to make an accurate estimate
of a situation, or the receiver’s action is the outcome of a competitive valuation process, e.g. a
stock market price, a wage, or an auction price. To capture this behavioral assumption, let the
receiver’s payoﬀ for each issue be
uR(θk,a k)=−(ak − θk)2. (5)
Note that (5) is the quadratic loss function used in the standard application of the Crawford-
Sobel model in the cheap talk literature. Since the receiver’s utility function is supermodular,
uR
12 =2> 0, comparative cheap talk is an equilibrium for symmetric f if the sender’s utility
function is also supermodular and the symmetry assumptions of Theorem 1 hold.
14In the following we consider several diﬀerent functional forms for the sender’s utility function.
All of these meet the supermodularity condition, but generate diﬀerent functional forms for com-
parative cheap talk equilibria when the game is not symmetric. The diﬀerent functional forms
also imply diﬀerent ex ante incentives for the sender to reveal more information through ﬁner
rankings or to reveal less information or even no information at all. Finer rankings increase the
correlation between each θk and the receiver’s estimate of θk, which beneﬁts the sender when the
sender’s utility function is supermodular. However, ﬁner rankings also imply a mean-preserving
spread in the ex ante distribution of actions taken by the receiver in valuation games, which hurts
the sender if her utility function is concave and helps the sender if her utility function is convex.
Quadratic sender preferences For the sender’s utility function, consider ﬁrst the quadratic
loss function used in the standard application of the Crawford-Sobel model. In this example, the
sender’s utility function diﬀers from the receiver’s only by a bias parameter b. We will consider
the multi-dimensional generalization of this model in which there is a separate bias bk in each
dimension, and in which the sender weights each issue by a parameter λk > 0:
uS
k(θk,a k;λk,b k)=−λk(ak − (θk + bk))2. (6)
On each issue the receiver’s ideal action is θk while the sender’s ideal action is θk +bk.T h e r e f o r e
there is some commonality of interest in each dimension since both players’ ideal actions are
increasing in θk, but also some conﬂict of interest since the sender’s ideal action is always bk
higher. Even for an arbitrarily small bias bk > 0, the sender cannot credibly state the true value
of θk, but Crawford and Sobel show that communication involving coarse statements within a
dimension is still possible if bk is not too large. For instance, with the uniform distribution, if
bk = 1
10 the sender can credibly state whether or not θk ∈ [0, 3
10),13 and as bk becomes smaller more
partitions become possible. However, when the conﬂict of interest becomes too large (bk > 1
4 for
the uniform distribution), the incentive to exaggerate is too strong for interval cheap talk within
a dimension to be credible.
Since uS
k is supermodular, Theorem 1 implies that, no matter how strong the conﬂict of interest
within each dimension, comparative cheap talk across dimensions is an inﬂuential equilibrium in
the symmetric case where bk = b and λk = λ for all k,a n df is symmetric. Regarding the
relative payoﬀsf r o mﬁner and coarser rankings, with quadratic preferences the positive impact
of supermodularity dominates the negative eﬀect of concavity so the sender is better oﬀ with the
13The statements imply actions of ak =
3
20 and ak =
13
20 respectively. From (6), if θk =
3
10 the sender is exactly
indiﬀerent between these two actions, if θk <
3
10 the smaller action is preferred, and if θk >
3
10 the larger action
is preferred. So interval cheap talk of this form is credible. Details of all assertions throughout this section are
available upon request.
15Figure 1: Expected sender per-issue payoﬀs in uniform-quadratic expert game
complete ranking rather than no ranking or any partial ranking. Figure 1 depicts the sender’s
maximum per-issue ex-ante expected payoﬀ from interval cheap talk in each dimension and from
comparative cheap talk across dimensions as a function of b for the cases N =2a n dN =5w i t h
the i.i.d. uniform distribution.14 As N increases comparative cheap talk approaches the case of
full information revelation as shown in Theorem 2, so for any given b>0 the sender’s per-issue
expected payoﬀ is higher under comparative cheap talk if N is allowed to become suﬃciently
large. However, for any given N the sender’s per-issue expected payoﬀ is higher under interval
cheap talk if b is suﬃciently small.
Now turn to the asymmetric case. For any two distinct action proﬁles a =( a1,a 2)a n d
a0 =( a0
1,a 0









With quadratic preferences this takes the simple aﬃne form, θk = α + βθk0 for constants α, β.
Supermodularity then implies that senders on one side of this line will strictly prefer one proﬁle
while those on the other side will strictly prefer the other.
14Note that if f is not independent then messages in one dimension aﬀect estimates in other dimensions, so
interval cheap talk in a multidimensional model may not simply be “products” of one-dimensional interval cheap
talk.
16Let the sender’s messages in a candidate equilibrium be m = {θ2 ≤ α∗ + β∗θ1} and m0 =
{θ2 >α ∗ + β∗θ1}, for some constants α∗,β∗ with β∗ > 0. Let the receiver’s optimal actions in
response be ak = E[θk|m]a n da0
k = E[θk|m0]f o rk =1 ,2. These messages and actions constitute
an equilibrium if (7) holds exactly for those θ1, θ2 such that θ2 = α∗+β∗θ1. While we present our
results in this section in terms of the sender explicitly adjusting her ranking strategy to reﬂect the
asymmetries, all announcement strategies can be equally well understood in terms of the receiver
adjusting his interpretation of the messages.15
From Theorem 3 we know that for suﬃciently small asymmetries such an equilibrium exists
with α∗ close to 0 and β∗ close to 1. In fact, comparative cheap talk is often robust to substantial
asymmetries in this quadratic expert game. To illustrate this, assume that f is i.i.d. uniform in
what follows. Theorem 3 tells us (and computations indicate) that similar conclusions also obtain
for general asymmetric f.
First consider asymmetries in the biases while holding the weights constant, λ1 = λ2.I nt h i s
case, for all 0 ≤ b1 − b2 < 1
2,a ni n ﬂuential equilibrium exists where β∗ =1a n dα∗ > 0, with α∗
the solution to
α(α2 − 3α − 1)
3(α2 − 2α − 1)
= b1 − b2.
In such equilibria, the sender adjusts his pronouncements in favor of θ1 by the constant amount
α∗. For larger values of b1 − b2, equilibria with β∗ = 1 do not exist, but computations indicate
that inﬂuential equilibria still exist (with, e.g., α∗ > 0a n dα∗ + β∗ < 1) for all b1,b 2 ∈ [0,1].
Now let the weights λk vary with the biases held constant, b1 = b2 = b.A n i n ﬂuential
equilibrium exists for 1/3 <λ 2/λ1 < 3i fb =1 /2, and for 3/5 <λ 2/λ1 < 5/3i fb = 1. Consistent
with the results of Levy and Razin (2003), as b becomes large, computations verify that the
interval for λ2/λ1 that permits comparative cheap talk becomes small.
When the biases bk and weights λk lie in compact sets, the corresponding set of quadratic
sender preferences is the image of a continuous parameterization from a compact set and so
Theorem 4 applies. To generate an explicit expression for N∗, consider the case where b =1a n d
normalize the weights so that 1 = λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ... ≥ λN > 0. When N = 2, recall that an inﬂuential
equilibrium exists provided λ2 >r≡ 3
5. It follows that when N =3a ni n ﬂuential equilibrium
exists when λ3 >r 2 since either λ2 >r , in which case comparative cheap talk on issues 1 and
2i si n ﬂuential, or λ2 ≤ r, in which case we must have λ3/λ2 >rso comparative cheap talk on
i s s u e s2a n d3i si n ﬂuential. Generalizing, we see that an inﬂuential equilibrium exists for the
N-dimensional game if λN >r N−1. It follows that when the λk lie in a compact set [x,1] with
15A similar situation arises in interval cheap talk. For instance, the sender could explicitly state that the variable
is in the range [0,c]o r( c,1], or the sender could just state that the variable is high or low and leave it to the
receiver to make the appropriate inference of c based on all available information.






Note that it is possible in the last example to construct a sequence {λk} with λk ≤ rk−1 for
each k, such that an inﬂuential equilibrium does not exist for any N. Such a sequence cannot
lie in a compact set in (0,1], the relevant space for the λk. Similarly, the results of Levy and
Razin (2003) suggest that inﬂuential cheap talk may not exist when the biases bk are allowed
to be unboundedly large. Observe in this respect that since the ﬁrst derivatives of quadratic
functions are aﬃne functions of the bias bk, a set of quadratic preferences with unboundedly large
bk’s is itself not (uniformly) bounded under the C2—uniform convergence norm and so, by the
Arzela-Ascoli Theorem, not compact (see, e.g., Mas-Collell, 1985).
Multiplicatively separable sender preferences The quadratic sender utility function in
(6) is typically used in applications of one-dimensional cheap talk because of its relative ease of
analysis and its potential to generate credible communication. However, in a multidimensional
environment the potential for communication exists in even simpler models where the sender’s
preferences are monotonic so that the sender always wants to exaggerate the maximum amount.
To see this consider a valuation game where uR has the same quadratic form as above, but the
sender’s utility function takes the multiplicatively separable form
uS
k = λkv(θk)w(ak)( 8 )
where v is a continuous, positive, increasing function and w is a continuous, increasing function.
Note that cheap talk is not inﬂuential in a single dimension since the sender always wants the
receiver to take the maximum action. However uS
12 = v0w0 > 0 so the sender’s utility function
is supermodular and, by Theorem 1, comparative cheap talk is an equilibrium in the symmetric
case. Regarding sender payoﬀs, if w is linear or convex then supermodularity implies the sender
is necessarily better oﬀ from revealing ﬁner information, but if w is suﬃciently concave the sender
will prefer to withhold such information.
An attractive feature of this speciﬁcation of sender preferences is that in many cases compar-
ative cheap talk is fully robust to asymmetries, no matter how large. For instance, if v(0) = 0,
and N = 2, the set of sender types who are indiﬀerent between two diﬀerent action proﬁles takes
the particularly simple form v(θ2)=βv(θ1) for some constant β>0. Such an equilibrium exists
when N =2 ,regardless of the asymmetries in f or the λk’s. Intuitively, the slope term β has
enough room to move around in the unit box to adjust for any degree of asymmetries.16 How-
16Details of this result, which requires some mild regularity conditions, are available on request. Note that when
v(0) > 0 the model resembles that of quadratic sender preferences in that the indiﬀerence locus also has an intercept
term α. As with quadratic sender preferences, such an intercept term may not have enough room in the unit box
to adjust for arbitrarily large asymmetries.
18ever, when asymmetries are very large, β w i l lb ec l o s et o0o r∞, and so the informativeness of
such a ranking will be limited. Such large asymmetries essentially reduce a multi-dimensional
game into a one-dimensional game. Nevertheless, with our next example of a valuation game we
show the existence of inﬂuential equilibria whose informativeness is not undermined by arbitrary
asymmetries.
State-independent sender preferences N o wc o n s i d e ra ne v e ns i m p l e rs p e c i ﬁcation of




where w is a continuous, increasing function as before. Since the sender’s payoﬀ depends only on
the receiver’s valuation ak, this model is especially applicable to situations where only monetary
values are important. For instance a sell-side stock analyst reports on the value θk of diﬀerent
stocks to investors and only cares about pushing up the market valuations regardless of the actual
value of the assets. Or an auction house provides price estimates to competing buyers and cares
only about maximizing revenue.
Because of this state-independence, the utility function is only weakly supermodular, but this
is still suﬃcient for comparative cheap talk to be credible under the assumptions of Theorem 1.
Therefore comparative cheap talk may play a role in situations such as the provision of estimated
sales prices to buyers by auction houses. Even if the incentive to exaggerate undermines the
credibility of the absolute information in such price estimates, buyers might still believe the relative
information in the estimates. Regarding sender payoﬀs, weak supermodularity implies that the
sender is ex ante strictly better oﬀ revealing coarse information if w is concave and revealing ﬁner
information if w is convex.17 Ironically, under the stock analyst interpretation, this implies that
the analyst is better oﬀ from ﬁner rankings only if she is rewarded disproportionately for pushing
up the price of stocks or is risk loving.
Regarding asymmetries, a key regulatory issue in the securities industry is whether sell-side
analysts favor stocks of companies that do business with the analyst’s investment bank. Clearly
such favoritism will undermine the usefulness of analyst reports, but it is often argued that
investors can see through such biases and still garner some information from an analyst’s ratings.
Since uS
k is not strictly supermodular one cannot directly apply Theorem 3 to analyze this question,
but it can be shown that the conclusions of Theorem 3 obtain.
17Distinct from the payoﬀ eﬀects due to concavity/convexity, in the auction example if there are buyer informa-
tion rents then revealing information through such a ranking increases auction revenues via the linkage principle
(Chakraborty, Gupta, and Harbaugh, 2001).
19Speciﬁcally, consider the case where f is i.i.d. uniform, N =2 ,a n duS
k = λkak.I nt h i sc a s e ,
the sender is indiﬀerent between two action proﬁles a =( a1,a 2)a n da0 =( a0
1,a 0
2) if and only if
λ1a1 + λ2a2 = λ1a0
1 + λ2a0
2. (9)
This is a restriction only on the slope of the line joining a and a0. Consequently, many types of
equilibria are possible. We consider a simple one with two messages in the aﬃne form, m = {θ2 ≤
α+βθ1} and m0 = {θ2 >α+βθ1},w i t hβ ∈ [0,1] and α =1 /2−β/2 ≥ 0. In the space of a1,a 2,
such a line θ2 = α + βθ1 passes through the point (1/2,1/2). Normalizing λ1 =1≥ λ2 = λ>0,
and substituting ak = E[θk|m]a n da0
k = E[θk|m0]f o rk =1 ,2 into equation (9), one sees that









In the symmetric case where λ = 1, the line forms the 45◦ diagonal and the sender’s statement is
equally informative about both issues. As λ becomes smaller and issue 2 becomes relatively less
important, the line becomes increasingly ﬂat and provides less and less information about issue
1. However, even in the limit when the sender puts overwhelming weight on issue 1, the ranking
still provides considerable information about issue 2 that is of relevance to the receiver.
4.2 Recommendation games
We now turn to games where the receiver chooses a binary action in each dimension in any
equilibrium, e.g. a legislator votes for or against a bill after listening to a lobbyist, a consumer
buys a product or not after listening to a salesperson, or an employer hires a student or not
after looking at recommendation letters. Such games have all the properties of continuous action
games, and in addition, have some novel and empirically interesting implications of their own.
To make things concrete, assume that the sender is a professor who knows the quality of N
students and the receiver is an employer who will hire a student k if his expected quality given
all available information is above some threshold. To capture this let the sender’s and receiver’s
payoﬀ for each student be
uS
k = λk(θk − τS
k )ak (10)
uR
k =( θk − τR
k )ak (11)
where τi
k ∈ (0,1) is a threshold quality for student k above which the student is worth employing
according to i. With such preferences, the receiver’s responses in any equilibrium will be binary
20– he will choose the action ak = 1 (i.e., hire the student) if the expected quality of student k is
above τR
k given all available information, and choose the action ak = 0 otherwise. For simplicity
assume that there is no limit to the number of students an employer can hire, but such limits
would have no eﬀect on the results.18
Before analyzing comparative cheap talk, ﬁrst consider interval cheap talk on one dimension
that is analogous to that examined in the quadratic example. If the professor expects the cheap
talk to be inﬂuential, the professor will recommend a student if and only if θk ≥ τS
k .A n d i f
the employer believes the recommendation, the employer will hire a recommended student if
E[θk|θk ≥ τS
k ] >τ R
k and not hire an unrecommended student if E[θk|θk <τ S
k ] <τ R
k .T h e r e f o r e
it is an inﬂuential equilibrium for the professor to disclose whether student quality θk is in the
interval (τS
k ,1] or not if E[θk|θk <τ S
k ] <τ R
k <E [θk|θk ≥ τS
k ]. For τS
k suﬃciently close to τR
k this
condition will be satisﬁed, but if τS
k and τR
k are too far apart then the conﬂict of interest is too
great for interval cheap talk to be credible.
Since both uR and uS are continuous and supermodular, Theorem 1 applies in the symmetric
model where the λk = λ, τS
k = τS and τR
k = τR for all k and f is symmetric. For instance, consider
t h ec a s ew h e r eτS =0 ,τR = 3
5 and f is i.i.d. uniform. Under the uniformity assumption, the
expected value of the jth worst student is E[θj:N]=j/(N + 1). Thus, when the professor ranks
two students the employer will infer that the lower ranked student has an expected quality of 1
3
while the higher ranked student has an expected of quality of 2
3 so the employer will only hire
the latter. Given this, the professor indeed recommends the better student since supermodularity
implies that the better student provides her with a higher marginal beneﬁt from being hired.
Regarding ex ante sender payoﬀs, revealing a partial ranking may be preferable to providing
either the complete ranking or no information at all. For instance, in the example above with
N =3 ,s i n c eE[θk]=1
2 <τ R, revealing no information implies that no student will be hired.




three students, so that only the top student is hired. However, if the professor only identiﬁes the








8 >τ R for each of them and they are both hired. Such a partial ranking is thus
ex—ante payoﬀ optimal for the professor. As N increases, Theorem 2 applies and the complete
ranking identiﬁes almost precisely the fractions of the students who are above and below τR,
which is approximately the same outcome as under full information, and is the ideal case for the
employer. However, the professor can ensure that a strictly larger fraction of students is hired by
18Similarly, there might be multiple employers, each of which can hire a limited number of students. As long as
the professor’s message is public, the results are unchanged. In such a case the more appropriate interpretation
of the example is that of a college disclosing information about students via transcripts, rather than a professor
providing possibly private recommendations.
21withholding some information through a partial ranking.19
The payoﬀ gains from a partial ranking might explain why some colleges either explicitly
withhold transcript information or inﬂate grades so much that the best students are hard to
diﬀerentiate from merely good students. Note that as the distribution of students becomes more
favorable, a higher proportion of students can be put in the top category and still make the
threshold. Hence, “grade inﬂation” should be more severe in more elite schools.
These results apply to the symmetric case, i.e. the professor does not have a “favorite” student
and the employer has no reason to expect that any one student is better than another. With such
asymmetries communication may not be credible when the number of students who make the
threshold τR depends on the ranking. For instance, it is a more positive signal for an unfavored
student to be ranked higher than for a favored student to be ranked higher. Therefore, regardless
of which student is actually better, if the threshold τR is very high a professor might be tempted
to rank the unfavored student higher so that at least one student gets a job. However, even though
uR
k fails the regularity conditions that guarantee an interior solution to the receiver’s problem,
the discreteness of the receiver’s actions makes robustness arguments to small asymmetries even
simpler than those employed in Theorem 3. As long as the asymmetries are relatively small, the
number of students that make the threshold will not depend on the ranking. Since supermodular-
ity still ensures that the sender wants the best issues to make the threshold, comparative cheap
talk is still an equilibrium.
5 Extensions: A Discussion
Interdependent actions We have assumed that the receiver action in each dimension is
independent of his actions in other dimensions, but in some applications this might be inappro-
priate. For example, in the recommendation game a buyer might be interested in purchasing only
one product even if multiple products are above the threshold τR. Clearly this does not does not
reduce the salesperson’s incentive to rank products truthfully and so it does not aﬀect any of our
results. Similarly, in the professor-employer example, a limit on the number of positions available
does not change the results. In this example a more interesting case of interdependent actions
is where θ represents diﬀerent attributes of one student (e.g. research skills, teaching ability,
etc.). In such a case, if the action proﬁle a represents the details of the contract (teaching load,
research support, salary, etc.) that will be oﬀered to the student, then comparative statements
19Letting F be the distribution of each i.i.d. θk, in the limit the sender can put fraction 1 − F(τ
∗)o ft h ei s s u e s
in the top category where τ
∗ satisﬁes E[θk|θk ≥ τ
∗]=τ
R.I n t h i s e x a m p l e w h e r e F is uniform and τ
R =3 /5,
τ
∗ =1 /5 so in the limit the proportion of students above the threshold is 1 − F(1/5) =
4
5. In contrast, under the




22like “the student is relatively better at research” might still be inﬂuential and enable the sender
to trade-oﬀ teaching loads against research requirements. Aspects of this problem are addressed
in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2003).
Sender actions The model can be extended to include actions taken by the sender as
well as the receiver. For instance in coordination games if both sides agree on the ranking of
outcomes, cheap talk can sometimes resolve strategic uncertainty over which action each side
intends to take (Farrell, 1987; Maynard Smith, 1991; Farrell and Rabin, 1996). Baliga and Morris
(2002) consider coordination games in which there is one-sided uncertainty about payoﬀss ot h a t
the ranking of outcomes is state-dependent as in our model, rather than state-independent as
in models with only strategic uncertainty. For instance, two ﬁrms must each decide whether to
invest in complementary research projects and one company has private information about the
proﬁtability of their own investment. They ﬁnd the strong negative result that in a binary action
game if the informed side always wants the uninformed side to take a particular action, e.g., wants
the other ﬁrm to invest, then no cheap talk of any kind is possible. Note that this result applies
to games in a single dimension. If the two ﬁrms are considering several diﬀerent projects, it is
straightforward to show that comparative cheap talk can be used to credibly rank the diﬀerent
projects and thereby increase investment eﬃciency.
Private receiver information Often the receiver will also have some private information
that is relevant to his decision. Such information creates asymmetries from the perspective of the
receiver that can give the sender an incentive to lie about the ranking. For instance, if an employer
privately interviews diﬀerent job applicants and the threshold for employment is relatively low,
a professor might try to artiﬁcially boost a weak job candidate at the expense of a stronger
candidate who is likely to interview well enough to receive a job anyway. In the two types of
games analyzed in Section 4 it can be shown that comparative cheap talk is robust to private
information held by the decision maker in that, even if the complete ranking is not credible, there
always exists a two-category partial ranking that is credible for a large enough number of issues.
For an analysis of this equilibrium in valuation games see Chakraborty, Gupta, and Harbaugh
(2003).
6C o n c l u s i o n
We ﬁnd that simple complementarity and symmetry conditions are suﬃcient for cheap talk across
dimensions to be credible even when interests are too opposed to support cheap talk in a single
dimension. We also ﬁnd that the amount of information revealed by comparative cheap talk
23can be considerable. When we allow for asymmetries, comparative cheap talk continues to be
credible if the asymmetries are not too large. For a suﬃciently large number of issues, there are
always some issues which are suﬃciently close to being symmetric for comparative cheap talk to
be credible. These results broaden our understanding of how mere cheap talk can be used by
individuals and institutions to communicate information.
7A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . Fix some p∗ ∈ P∗ and, via Theorem 1, let the equilibrium actions be
(α∗
1,α ∗
2) when the announced message is θ1 >θ 2 so that (α∗
2,α ∗
1) is the action proﬁle when the












1}. Notice that for each a ∈ Z,a0 ∈ Z0, and arbitrary uS ∈ U2
S, the sender prefers a to
a0 iﬀ
uS











for ∆i strictly increasing in its ﬁrst argument. By the inverse function theorem, there exist
increasing functions l1(·)a n dl2(·)s u c ht h a t( 1 3 )c a na l s ob ew r i t t e na sθ2 ≤ l1(θ1;a,a0)a n d
θ1 ≥ l2(θ2;a,a0).
Given f ∈ D2 and uR ∈ U2
R,f o rk =1 ,2l e tαk : Z × Z0 → R2 and α0
k : Z × Z0 → R2 be the
solution to the receiver’s problem:
αk(a,a0;p)=a r gm a x
ak
Ef[uR
k (θk,a k)|∆1(θ1,a 1,a 0
1;p) ≥ ∆2(θ2,a 0
2,a 2;p)] (14)
α0
k(a,a0;p)=a r gm a x
ak
Ef[uR
k (θk,a k)|∆1(θ1,a 1,a 0
1;p) ≤ ∆2(θ2,a 0
2,a 2;p)] (15)









24An equilibrium is a pair a,a0 such that ψ(a,a0;p) = 0. Whenever such an equilibrium exists it is
inﬂuential, by construction of Z,Z0. By Theorem 1, it exists for any p∗ ∈ P∗ with equilibrium
actions α∗ =( α∗
1,α ∗
2)a n dα∗0 =( α∗
2,α ∗
1).
It is immediate that ψ is continuous in its arguments. Let J = ∂a,a0ψ(α∗,α ∗0;p∗)b et h e
Jacobian of ψ. We wish to apply the implicit function theorem at such p∗ i.e., show that detJ 6=


















where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Keeping in mind the symmetries in the symmetric
equilibrium, especially the fact that the receivers optimal actions α,α0 depend on the initial
actions a,a0 only through their eﬀect on the functions l1 and l2,i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to verify that



































































where superscripts ∗ denote derivatives evaluated at symmetric point (α∗,α ∗0;p∗). Using the block
symmetric form of J we see that
detJ =1− 4(x1x4 − x2x3) − 2(x1 + x4) (18)
It is immediate that the set of primitives for which detJ 6= 0 is open, since its complement is
closed. It remains to show that this set is dense in P∗.
Suppose that detJ =0f o rs o m ep∗. We show explicitly that one can perturb uS∗
slightly to
make detJ 6=0 .P i c kε>0s u ﬃciently small and perturb uS∗ as follows
b uS∗(z,a)=uS∗(z,a)+τε(z,a)
where τε is C2 satisfying
lim
ε→0










2)=( 2 ε + ε2)uS
a(z,α∗
2)
20The speciﬁc version of the implicit function theorem we use is that from Mas-Collell (1985), Chapter 1, C.3.3.
25for all z.F o r ε small, this can always be done preserving the strict supermodularity of b uS∗.





b xi = xi(1 + ε),i=2 ,4
Using detJ =0 ,w et h e nh a v e :
det b J =1 − 4(b x1b x4 − b x2b x3) − 2(b x1 + b x4)
=1 − 4(x1x4 − x2x3) − 2(
x1
1+ε





which can be made to be non—zero by perturbing ε, unless x1 = x4 = 0 in which case, since
detJ =0 , we obtain that x2,x 3 6=0 , so that a perturbation very similar to the one above will
suﬃce (e.g. by dropping the ε2 term in the expression for τε
a). ¥
8 Bibliography
1. Athey, Susan (2002), “Monotone comparative statics under uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 117, 187—223.
2. Aumann, Robert J. and Sergiu Hart (2003), “Long cheap talk,” Econometrica, 71, 1619—
1660.
3. Austen-Smith, David (1990), “Information acquisition and orthogonal argument,” in Polit-
ical Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation, William A. Barnett, Melvin
J. Hinich, and Norman J. Schoﬁeld, eds., Cambridge University Press.
4. Baliga, Sandeep and Stephen Morris (2002), “Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 105, 450—468.
5. Battaglini, Marco (2002), “Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk,” Economet-
rica, 70, 1379—1401.
6. Billingsley, Patrick, (1995), Probability and Measure, Wiley, New York.
7. Chakraborty, Archishman, Nandini Gupta, and Rick Harbaugh (2001), “Best foot forward
or best for last in a sequential auction?” forthcoming, RAND Journal of Economics.
8. Chakraborty, Archishman, Nandini Gupta, and Rick Harbaugh (2003), “Seller cheap talk
in common-value auctions,” working paper.
269. Chakraborty, Archishman and Rick Harbaugh (2003), “Cheap talk comparisons in multi-
issue bargaining,” Economics Letters, 78, 357—363.
10. Chan, William, Hao Li, and Wing Suen (2003), “Why are grades so high?” working paper.
11. Crawford, Vincent P. (2003), “Lying for strategic advantage: rational and boundedly ratio-
nal misrepresentation of intention,” American Economic Review, 93, 133—149.
12. Crawford, Vincent P. and Joel Sobel (1982), “Strategic information transmission,” Econo-
metrica, 6, 1431—1450.
13. Dessein, Wouter (2002), “Authority and communication in organizations,” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 69, 811—838.
14. Dimitrakas, Vassilios and Yianis Saraﬁdis (2004), “Advice from an expert with unknown
motives”, working paper.
15. Enquist, Magnus, Stefano Ghirlanda, and Peter L. Hurd (1998), “Discrete conventional
signalling of a continuous variable,” Animal Behavior, 56, 749—754.
16. Farrell, Joseph (1987), “Cheap talk, coordination, and entry,” RAND Journal of Economics,
18, 34—39.
17. Farrell, Joseph and Matthew Rabin (1996), “Cheap talk,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
10, 103—118.
18. Fischer, P. E. and P. C. Stocken (2001), “Imperfect information and credible communica-
tion,” Journal of Accounting Research, 39, 119—134.
19. Jackson, Matthew O. and Hugo F. Sonnenschein (2003), “Overcoming Incentive Constraints
by Linking Decisions,” forthcoming, Econometrica.
20. Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (2004), “The art of conversation, eliciting information from
experts through multi-stage communication,” Journal of Economic Theory, 117, 147—179.
21. Levy, Gilat and Ronny Razin (2003), “Multidimensional cheap talk,” working paper.
22. Mas-Collell, Andreu (1985), The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium: A Diﬀerentiable
Approach, Econometric Society Monograph No. 9, Cambridge.
23. Maynard Smith, John (1991), “Honest signalling: the Philip Sidney game,” Animal Behav-
ior, 42, 1034—1035.
2724. Morgan, John, and Phillip C. Stocken (2003), “An analysis of stock recommendations,”
RAND Journal of Economics, 34, 183—203.
25. Morris, Stephen (2001), “Political correctness,” Journal of Political Economy, 109, 231—265.
26. Ostrovsky, Michael and Michael Schwarz (2003), “Equilibrium information disclosure: grade
inﬂation and unraveling,” working paper.
27. Ottaviani, Marco and Francesco Squintani (2002), “Non-fully strategic information trans-
mission,” working paper.
28. Sobel, Joel (1985), “A theory of credibility,” Review of Economic Studies, 52, 557—573.
29. Spector, David (2000), “Rational debate and one-dimensional conﬂict,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 115, 181—200.
30. Stocken, Phillip C. (2000), “Credibility of voluntary disclosure,” RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 31, 359—374.
31. Topkis, Donald M. (1998), Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University
Press.
28